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I. INTRODUCTION
The Immigration and Naturalization Service's recent processing
of Cambodian refugees for resettlement in the United States raises
serious doubts about the accuracy of its "prior persecutor" determina-
tions. Refugee law of both the United States and the international
community prohibits the granting of asylum or resettlement to any
person previously involved in the persecution of others. Legislators
throughout the world share the view that such persons do not deserve
international protection.' Few question the legitimacy of such a
1. A number of U.S. statutes and international treaties specifically exclude "prior per-
secutors" from their protection. The emergence of Nazi war criminals after World War II
triggered worldwide concern over the treatment of "prior persecutors." For U.S. Statutes
responding to this problem, see, e.g., Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009
(repealed 1952); The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (current ver-
sion codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1151-1153, 1157-1159, 1181, 1182, 1251, 1253, 1255 n.,
1521-1525; 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982)).
In the international arena, crimes, against peace, war crimes, and crimes against human-
ity were defined in Article 6 of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, August 8, 1945, art. 6, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of
the Charter defines crimes against humanity as follows:
[Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or perse-
cutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan.
I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATus OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 272-74
(1966) (citing the London Charter).
The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees con-
tains, in paragraph 7(d), the provision that the High Commissioner's competence shall not
REJECTED CAMBODIAN REFUGEES
policy.
Evidence strongly suggests, however, that the screening process
of the United States improperly excluded thousands of innocent
Cambodians because they allegedly persecuted others under the
oppressive Khmer Rouge regime.2 These refugees' hopes of perma-
nently resettling in a safe environment to enjoy basic human rights rest
entirely at the discretion of the resettlement countries. Because of the
potentially disasterous consequences, it is imperative that the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service's screening process be consistent
with domestic and international law.
This Note concedes that the current screening process, which has
denied refugee status to thousands of Cambodians, does not techni-
cally violate the Constitution or U.S. immigration law. The process
does, however, contravene several fundamental principles of adminis-
trative law and congressional intent for the Refugee Act of 1980.
Moreover, the screening process violates the international legal obliga-
tions of the United States. This Note will first review U.S. domestic
law and then examine the international legal obligations of the United
States regarding refugee rights.
II. BACKGROUND
The status and rights of refugees are covered in a number of
sources. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) must
comply with the Constitution, congressional statutes, and its own reg-
ulations and rules. 3 In addition to these domestic legal constraints,
the INS must adhere to international agreements ratified by the
United States.4
These sources of law consistently deny refugees who are deemed
"prior persecutors" the protection and resettlement opportunities
otherwise available to them.5 Such refugee protections include the fol-
lowing: the opportunity to meet the U.S. statutory definition of "refu-
gee," thereby establishing eligibility for resettlement in the United
extend to any person for whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has com-
mitted a crime mentioned in Article VI of the London Charter. Id. at 272. Finally, the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states, in Article 1(f), that the provi-
sions of the Convention "shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that (a) he has committed... a crime against humanity."
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. l(f), 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention] (The United States became a party to the Con-
vention in 1967).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 143-57.
3. 2 P. MUTHARIKA, THE ALIEN UNDER AMERICAN LAW 272 (1984).
4. Id.; see also infra note 104 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, con-
cluded May 23, 1969, 23 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969)) and accompanying text.
5. For a definition of "prior persecutor," see infra notes 16, 57 and accompanying
text.
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States; the right to non-refoulement;6 the right to certain procedural
protections in the asylum process; and the protection of fundamental
human rights. A review of these sources of law establishes the legal
framework within which immigration officers make "prior persecutor"
determinations.
A. UNITED STATES LAW ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES
1. An Overview of Immigration Law
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), comprises
the basic immigration law in the United States today.7 With the
enactment of the INA, Congress created the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) that, as a branch of the Department of Justice,
administers and enforces the laws relating to the admission, exclusion,
deportation and naturalization of aliens. 8 Under the INA, the INS
exercises both legislative and adjudicative powers.9 The Department
of State, to a lesser degree, is also involved in the immigration process.
Its role is principally one of issuing advisory opinions to the INS on
asylum petitions;10 in addition, the Department's Refugee Bureau
works closely with the INS in processing overseas applicants for refu-
gee status.ll
Congress' enormous power over immigration and naturalization
matters is clearly evident in two Supreme Court decisions. In Boutilier
v. INS,12 the Supreme Court stated: "It has long been held that the
Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens
and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress
has forbidden." 13 Almost ten years later, in Mathews v. Diaz,'14 the
Court recognized congressional power to discriminate against and
6. The right of non-refoulement refers to the right of an alien not to be "expel[led] or
return[ed] ... in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion." Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, art. XXX, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol].
7. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982) [hereinafter INA].
8. A. LEIBOWITZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEE POLICY § 9.01 (1983).
9. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 26-52, 139-56, 194-214 (3d
ed. 1972) (outlining administrative law principles regarding delegation of rule making and
adjudicative powers to administrative agencies).
10. Avery, Refugee Status Decision Making: The Systems of Ten Countries, 19 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 235, 333-41 (1983).
11. STAFF REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., 2D
SESS., UNITED STATES PROCESSING OF KHMER REFUGEES 1 (Comm. Print 1984) [herein-
after STAFF REPORT].
12. 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (homosexual petitioner denied review of deportation order
because excludable as psychopathic personality as provided in statute).
13. Id. at 123.
14. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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among aliens on grounds considered unconstitutional if applied to
American citizens.15
Congress' authority also includes the power to determine whom
to admit. Currently, Congress employs a system of priorities that
excludes, among others, persons who have participated in the persecu-
tion of any other person on account of race, religion, or membership in
a particular social group. 16
2. The Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980,17 amending the Immigration and
Nationality Act, provided the first comprehensive program for refugee
admissions and resettlement in the United States.' 8 The Refugee Act
adopted a new definition of refugee that eliminated the previous ideo-
logical and geographic restrictions; 19 it also established the statutory
basis for excluding "prior persecutors" from the United States. 20
The Act adopted the definition of refugee found in the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 21 The leg-
islative history of the Act indicates the intent of Congress to bring
"United States law into conformity with our international treaty obli-
gations under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees... and the United Nations Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, which is incorporated by reference into United States
law through the Protocol. ' 22 Section 201 of the Refugee Act defines
"refugees" as follows:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality... and who is unable or unwilling to return to... that
country because of persecution.., on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.... The term
"refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or other-
wise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
15. Id. at 79-80; see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (recent decision con-
firming Diaz).
16. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1, § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (1982). Other
persons considered excludable are those with undesirable political beliefs or moral charac-
ter, and mental or physical disability. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982).
17. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1.
18. 2 P. MuTHARIKA, supra note 3, at 138.
19. Until the Refugee Act of 1980 the Immigration and Nationality Act basically
defined "refugees" as "persons fleeing persecution in communist countries or countries in
the Middle East." A. LElnowrrz, supra note 8, § 1.01, at 1-15 (citing INA, supra note 7).
The Refugee Act of 1980 changed a great deal of U.S. immigration law. Earlier legislation
had dealt only with problems of specific categories of refugees. See, eg., Displaced Persons
Act of 1948, supra note 1; Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-243 ch. 336, 67 Stat.
400 (1953).
20. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1, at § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
21. A. HELTON, MANUAL ON REPRESENTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS (1984).
22. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979).
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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 23
The Refugee Act of 1980 requires applicants for refugee admission to
establish three facts: they must meet the definition of refugee; they
must not have firmly resettled in any foreign country; and, except for
certain waived requirements of Section 212(a) of the INA, they must
be admissible as immigrants. 24 The definition of refugee automatically
excludes a "prior persecutor."
Furthermore, the Refugee Act of 1980 protects a refugee's right
to non-refoulement. The right of non-refoulement prohibits a nation
from returning a refugee to a country where the refugee fears persecu-
tion.25 Such protection, however, does not extend to an alien who has
persecuted others.26
3. Limits to INS Power
a. Administrative Law
Immigration officials enjoy relatively broad powers of discretion
in executing their duties.27 To properly limit this discretion, the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides for judicial review of
agency adjudications.28
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an appeals tribunal
independent of and distinct from the INS, and partially independent of
the judiciary, maintains a system of review at the administrative
level.2 9 Judicial review is also available for exclusion and deportation
orders.30 Courts may directly review procedural unfairness and errors
23. The Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1, at § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (1982).
24. Id. §§ 201(a), 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157(c).
25. Id. § 203(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1),(2).
26. The Refugee Act of 1980 authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to
grant asylum to an alien who is determined to be a refugee. Refugee Act of 1980, supra
note 1, at § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). Because a "prior persecutor" is not afforded refu-
gee status, he is ineligible for asylum. Similarly, section 203(e) of the Refugee Act, amend-
ing section 243(h) of the INA, states that the Attorney General shall not deport an alien if
the "alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country . . . ." Id. § 203(e), 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A) (1982). But this clause prohibiting deportation "shall not apply to
any alien if the Attorney General determines that the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id.; INA, supra note
7, at § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(1)(iii) (1986).
27. Federal courts have consistently upheld the use of such discretion by INS officers.
For a more thorough discussion, see Ludd, Administrative Discretion and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service: To Review or Not to Review?, 8 T. MARSHALL L.J. 65, 68
(1982).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
29. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION DEFENSE MANUAL § 6.1 (1977)
[hereinafter IMMIGRATION DEFENSE]; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.8 (1976). This five mem-
ber tribunal has the power to review certain kinds of decisions.
30. A. HELTON, supra note 21, at 176.
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of law, including potential statutory or constitutional violations. 31 In
addition, courts are empowered to examine possible abuses of adminis-
trative discretion.3 2 To determine whether an abuse of discretion has
occurred, courts typically apply a "rational basis" test.33 Simply
stated, this test precludes a finding of abusive discretion if an adminis-
trative officer had a sufficient or rational basis for the decision.3 4 The
courts will overturn arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise illegal
decisions.35
Overseas refugees seeking asylum in the United States, however,
do not enjoy the procedural safeguard of review.3 6 Refugees cannot
appeal a denial of asylum.3 7 Asylum is not a right, but rather a privi-
lege granted at the discretion of the INS district director.38 In 1950,
the Supreme Court declared: "Admission of aliens to the United States
is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government.
Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the
United States shall prescribe. It must be exercised in accordance with
the procedure which the United States provides. '3 9
b. United States Constitution
The constitutional limitations on INS decision-making and the
rights of aliens are developing areas of law. Traditionally, overseas
applicants have possessed virtually no "rights" under U.S. law.40 In
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Ludd, supra note 27, at 69.
34. Id.
35. IMMIGRATION DEFENSE, supra note 29, § 7.4(d)(1977); see also Foti v. INS, 375
U.S. 217, 228 (1963) (judicial review of denials of discretionary relief from deportation is
limited to whether there has been any abuse of discretion); Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 550
F.Supp. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
36. The application process for refugee status and asylum in the United States is easily
summarized. An applicant must first meet the definition of refugee under § 201(a) of the
Refugee Act of 1980, and not be excluded as a "prior persecutor." See supra notes 1, 23,
and 24, and accompanying text. An applicant then fills out Form 1-591 and, along with
supporting documents, submits it to an overseas officer responsible for the area in which the
applicant is located. A. HELTON, supra note 21, at 33. The individual, if over the age of
fourteen, is then interviewed personally, under oath, by an immigration officer. 8 C.F.R.
§ 207.2(b) (1986). An applicant must have a sponsor, either an individual or an organiza-
tion. A. HELTON, supra note 21, at 33. Denial of refugee status cannot be appealed. 8
C.F.R. § 207.4.
37. 8 C.F.R. § 207.4 (1986).
38. Id. at §§ 208.1-.8(a); see also In re Paktorovics, 156 F. Supp. 813, 816 (E.D.N.Y.
1957) (admission into U.S. a privilege, not a right, for alien outside of territory), rev'd on
other grounds, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
39. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (upholding
power of Attorney General to bar entry into U.S. without hearing of alien war bride).
40. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (alien vested constitutional
rights after lawfully entering and residing in the United States); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (alien on threshold of initial entry only owed due
process provided by authorized Congressional procedure).
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contrast, applicants on United States territory have enjoyed the consti-
tutional safeguards of due process and equal protection. 4'
The Supreme Court stated in Landon v. Plasencia42 that "an alien
seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and
has no constitutional rights regarding his application. ' 43 This is an
entirely rational and necessary position. The entire world cannot
claim the protection of the United States Constitution and Congress
must maintain power over immigration and control of the U.S.
border.44
Recently, however, the courts conceded that Congress has con-
ferred certain entitlements to asylum applicants presently in the
United States. These entitlements, in turn, trigger due process protec-
tion. The courts have noted two protectable interests for asylum
applicants.
First, the United States recognizes a liberty interest, the right of
non-refoulement.45 The 1967 United Nations Protocol, 46 to which the
United States became a signatory in 1968, incorporated the 1951 Con-
vention47 regarding the status of refugees. The 1951 Convention
declares that a contracting state cannot expel or return a refugee to
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
race, religion, nationality, or political beliefs.48 Congress codified this
international treaty obligation in the Refugee Act of 1980.49 In Yiu
Sing Chun v. Sava,50 the Second Circuit recognized this liberty inter-
est, concluding that a refugee who has a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion" in his homeland has a protectable interest created by both treaty
and statute.51 In such cases, the asylum applicant threatened with
refoulement may receive some due process protection not available to
41. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (alien illegally discriminated against
in violation of his 14th Amendment rights).
42. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
43. Id. at 32; see also Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542 (aliens seeking admission into the United
States have no rights; the United States may grant priviledges upon terms that it
prescribes); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891) (an accepted maxim
of international law is that every sovereign nation has the inherent power to forbid entrance
of foreigners and admit those under prescribed conditions).
44. Note, Due Process Rights of Asylum Applicants Expanded to Include Stowaways, 50
BROOKLYN L. REV. 751, 771 (1984).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1). Section 1253 states: "The Attorney General shall not
deport or return any alien.., to a country if the Attorney General determines that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality or membership in a particular social group or political opinion." Id.
46. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6.
47. 1951 Convention, supra note 1.
48. Id. art. 33(1).
49. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1.
50. 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 877.
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an alien claiming only admission.52 The severity of harm to an errone-
ously excluded asylee outweighs the administrative burden of provid-
ing a hearing.53
Second, the courts also found a protectable property interest.
This interest is based on the right to petition for asylum and the right
to be heard on that petition.54 Once Congress has granted these lib-
erty and property interests, the INS cannot deny them without the
constitutional protection of due process.
Governmental agencies such as the INS face two additional
restrictions. First, an agency must abide by its own promulgated regu-
lations and procedures.55 Second, an agency must operate under ade-
quate standards or guidelines and risk a violation of due process.
4. Scope of Statutory Exclusion for "Prior Persecutors"
a. Definition of "Prior Persecutors"
The broad language of the Refugee Act of 1980 provides little
insight as to the type of conduct that triggers a denial of refugee sta-
tus.5 6 The Act's language describing prior persecutors as "any person
who ordered, incited, or otherwise participated in the persecution...
[of others]" is ambiguous. Adjudications and various governmental
publications provide little assistance.
Although no universally accepted definition of persecution exists,




54. Id. at 877 n.25. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) directs the Attorney General to establish asy-
lum procedures. Based on this provision, courts have concluded that a property right
exists. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982). In
Haitian Refugee Center, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Congress and the executive have created, at a minimum, a constitutionally pro-
tected right to petition our government for political asylum. Specifically, we find in
the federal regulations establishing an asylum procedure.., a clear intent to grant
aliens the right to submit and the opportunity to substantiate their claim for asy-
lum.
Id.
55. 2 P. MUTHARIKA, supra note 3, at 272; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96
(1974); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (Bureau of Indian Affairs failed to
comply with own internal procedures by not publishing eligibility requirements for benefits
available to public).
56. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 29.
57. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES FOR
OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROCESSING (Aug. 1983) [hereinafter WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES].
These guidelines were an outgrowth of a review of refugee policy and Indochinese process-
ing. They superseded earlier guidelines of February 22, 1982, that provided inadequate
guidance for processing in particular Khmer applicants. See infra text accompanying notes
140-45. For discussion of the binding nature of the guidelines, see infra text accompanying
notes 205-07.
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It can be inferred, however, by reference to Article 33 of the [1951] Convention
[Relating to the Status of Refugees] and section 243(h) of the INA, that perse-
cution includes a threat to life or freedom. In context, a threat to life clearly
relates to the prospect of loss of life or serious physical injury. The threat to
freedom is less clearly defined. It certainly incudes risk of prolonged detention
or incarceration, significant restriction on freedom of movement.
58
A joint report by the State Department and the INS attempts to
interpret the scope of exclusion as to those persons considered prior
persecutors.5 9 The Joint Report states that the denial of refugee status
contemplated by the "second sentence" (i.e., the "prior persecutor"
exclusion clause in Section 201(a)) of the Refugee Act intended to
include not only those persons who directly committed or perpetrated
acts of persecution, but also those whose acts were less direct, so long
as they "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the per-
secution of others."60
In addition, at least two cases, one before the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals and one before the First Circuit Court of Appeals, have
established that the Refugee Act contemplated persecution by individ-
uals or non-governmental organizations as well as persecution by
organized governments. 61
b. Evidentiary Standard
A number of cases have explored the evidentiary standard used
by the INS and reviewing courts in determining whether an individual
is a "prior persecutor." In Fedorenko v. United States,62 the Supreme
Court upheld the government's denaturalization of an individual who
had concealed on his visa application his service as an armed guard at
a Nazi concentration camp. Because of the seriousness of the govern-
ment's action, however, the Court required of the government a bur-
den of "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence."63
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Laipenieks v. INS,6 held the INS
to the same high evidentiary standard when the INS sought to prove
that an individual involved with the Latvian Political Police had perse-
cuted others. The court interpreted Section 1251(a)(19) of the INA to
58. WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 9.
59. JOINT REPORT OF THE BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS (Dep't of State) AND
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (Dep't of Justice), THE PROCESSING
OF CAMBODIAN REFUGEES: SECOND SENTENCE ASPECTS (March 1985) [hereinafter
JOINT REPORT].
60. Id.
61. See McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981) (persecution by the
Provisional Irish Republican Army, a clandestine, non-governmental terrorist organiza-
tion); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100, 101 (Ist Cir. 1971) (fear of persecution by a mob is
sufficient grounds for staying deportation).
62. 499 U.S. 490 (1981).
63. Id.
64. 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
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allow deportation of aliens if they "ordered, incited, assisted or other-
wise participated in the persecution of any person .... -65 The court
limited deportation to circumstances where the evidence established
that the individual in question personally ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated; that is, the court deemed mere acquiescence or
membership in an organization insufficient. 66 The seriousness of
depriving an individual of refugee status justifies this high evidentiary
burden.
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO REFUGEES AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
The United Nations Charter and a number of international trea-
ties and declarations address the issues of refugee rights and the obli-
gations of nation states towards refugees. 67 The 1951 Convention68
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees69 established
the international legal principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits
nation states from returning refugees to territories where they would
be threatened with persecution. 70
These instruments exclude from their protection, however, refu-
gees that are deemed prior persecutors. 71 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 72 one of several international
organizations that protect and provide assistance to refugees, has pub-
lished the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refu-
65. Id. at 143.
66. Id.
67. Those which will be discussed below are the 1951 Convention, supra note 1; 1967
Protocol, supra note 6; Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U.N. Doe. A/6716 (1967); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Decla-
ration]; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1,
O.A.S. Off. Rec., OEA/Ser. L/VII.23, doc. 21 rev. (1968) [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off.
Rec., OEA/Ser.L/VII. 23, doc. 21 rev. (1980) [hereinafter American Declaration]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6361 (1976) [hereinafter Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]; International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
68. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33.
69. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6, art. I.
70. The 1951 Convention related only to persons affected by events in Europe occur-
ring prior to January 1, 1951. The 1967 Protocol extended the protection of the 1951
Convention by eliminating the geographic and date limitations.
71. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. l(f); 1967 Protocol, supra note 6, art. 1(2).
72. The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1950 as an annex to G.A. Res.
428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950). The functions of the
UNHCR are to provide international protection to refugees and supervise the application
of international conventions. I GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 1, at 18.
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gee Status Under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees.73 Authorities recognize this Handbook as an
authoritative interpretation of the refugee standard and view it as a
valuable aid in analyzing asylum claims.74 The Handbook lays down a
number of procedural protections designed to prevent refugees from
being haphazardly denied asylum.75 Finally, several human rights
instruments delineate a number of refugee entitlements.76
L The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees
The United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, and to those provisions of the 1951 Convention
that the 1967 Protocol incorporates. 77 Over ninety nations are party
to the Convention, the Protocol, or both. The Convention and the
1967 Protocol established the principle of non-refoulement, which pro-
hibits contracting states from expelling or returning a refugee "in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion." 78 This
internationally accepted principle arguably constitutes the most funda-
mental obligation of nation-states in the treatment of refugees. 79
Neither the Convention nor the Protocol guarantees a refugee the
right of entry to a country.80 Nevertheless, non-refoulement, at the
very least, restricts the otherwise well recognized right of a sovereign
state to admit or exclude noncitizens as it sees fit. 81
The protections and rights offered by these two treaties do not
extend to those guilty of persecuting others. Article l(f) of the Con-
vention, adopted by the Protocol, states: "The provisions of this con-
73. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER
THE 1951 CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
(Geneva 1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
74. See A. HELTON, supra note 21, at 2-3. For decisions that cite the HANDBOOK, see
Zavala-Bonella v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 569 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 244, 246 (1982); In re Rodriquez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465, 468 (1980).
75. See HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 45-51.
76. See sources cited supra note 67.
77. The U.S. Senate ratified the 1967 Protocol on October 4, 1968, with two reserva-
tions (one relating to taxation of refugees, the other to benefits available to refugees under
the Social Security Act). See 1967 Protocol, supra note 6.
78. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 33; 1967 Protocol, supra note 6, art. I(1).
79. Teitlebaum, Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy, 38 INT'L ORG. 429, 437
(1984).
80. Goodwin-Gill, Entry and Exclusion of Refugees: The Obligations of States and the
Protection Function of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 291, 300.
81. Teitlebaum, supra note 79, at 437.
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vention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that . . . he has committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity .... -"82 Simi-
larly, Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention provides that the benefits
of non-refoulement (Art. 33(1)) "may not.., be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a dan-
ger to the community of that country. '83
2. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
Because nation-states can legally deny important protections, the
procedure by which a nation excludes them becomes extremely impor-
tant. The UNHCR Handbook provides an authoritative interpreta-
tion of procedural safeguards under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol that a nation-state must follow before an individual is
excluded as a "prior persecutor." 84 Because the United States is
bound by these treaties, it must adhere to the Handbook's safeguards.
The Handbook explains the Convention's and Protocol's definition of
the term "refugee." Its publishers intended the explanations to guide
government officials of contracting states in their determination of ref-
ugee status.85 Chapter four of the Handbook discusses clauses of the
Convention that exclude from refugee status persons otherwise having
the characteristics of refugees. 86
In Part II, the Handbook discusses procedures for determining
refugee status. The Handbook requires each contracting state to
devise its own procedure consistent with that state's particular consti-
tutional and administrative requirements. 87 The Handbook further
recommends certain procedural requirements designed to ensure a
minimum level of protection for each applicant. 88 The requirements
include competent interpreters, necessary procedural guidance for the
82. 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. l(f).
83. Id. art. 33(2).
84. See HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 45-51; see also supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
85. HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 2.
86. Basically, three categories of persons otherwise having the characteristics of refu-
gees are excluded from refugee status. The first category consists of those persons already
receiving U.N. protection or assistance. Id. at 33-34. The second category is made up of
those persons not considered to be in need of international protection. Id. at 34. The third
category is persons not considered to be deserving of international protection. Id. at 35.
87. Id. at 45.
88. These requirements were recommended by the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme, at its twenty-eighth session in October 1977. The Committee
realized that the states bound by the Convention and the Protocol would establish different
procedures. It therefore sought to guarantee a few procedural safeguards. Id. at 45-46.
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applicant, and reasonable time to appeal a decision denying refugee
status.8 9
The Handbook, in discussing fact finding methods, states that the
burden of proving refugee status rests with the applicants. 90 However,
because of the difficulty of proof in these situations, the Handbook
provides that "if the applicant's account appears credible, he should,
unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of
the doubt." 91
3. Human Rights Guaranteed to Refugees
Some international instruments provide refugees seeking asylum
greater protection than does the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Proto-
col. The Declaration of Territorial Asylum requires that a nation-
state admit an individual fleeing persecution in a neighboring state.92
The American Convention on Human Rights93 and the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 94 similarly require that a
nation-state grant asylum to a refugee in accordance with its laws and
international agreements.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights creates a number of
rights and freedoms to which everyone, including a refugee, is enti-
tled. 95 Among these are "the right to life, liberty and security of per-
son" (Article 3);96 the right to not be "subjected to... cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment" (Article 5);97 "the right to seek and to enjoy
89. Id. at 46.
90. Id. at 47.
91. Id. at 47-48.
92. See Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 67, art. 3, par. 1. It states that
"no person referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subjected to measures such as
rejection of the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum,
expulsion or compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected to persecution."
Id.
93. American Convention, supra note 67, art. 2(7), states: "Every person has the right
to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of
the state and international conventions, in the event he is being pursued for political
offenses or related common crimes." Id. The United States is a signatory to this conven-
tion, and therefore legally bound. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
94. American Declaration, supra note 67, art. 27, states: "Every person has the right,
in cases of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in foreign
territory, in accordance with the laws of each country, and with international agreements."
Id. The United States is a member of the Organization of American States and therefore
bound to respect the rights enumerated in the American Declaration. Young-Anawaty,
International Human Rights Forum: A Means of Recourse for Refugees, 1982 MICH. Y.B.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 451, 459 n.94.
95. Universal Declaration, supra note 67.
96. Id. art. 3.
97. Id. art. 5. A similar provision can be found in Article 3 of the European Conven-




in other countries asylum from persecution" (Article 14);9 8 and the
"right to a nationality" (Article 15).99 In addition, the two Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights provide civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights to all people. 1°°
Finally, the provisions of the United Nations Charter arguably
impose obligations on nation-states to assist in refugee resettlement.
Refugees often suffer near total deprivation of human rights and con-
sequently pose serious economic and humanitarian problems for the
international community. Article 1 of the Charter lists as one of its
purposes the achievement of "international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanita-
rian character, and [the promotion] and [encouragement of] respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."' 01 Similarly, Article 55
states that "the United Nations shall promote universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
... "102 In Article 56, "all members pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."103
4. United States Bound by International Law
International law binds the United States in two ways. First, the
United States is bound by any international instrument that it has
signed and ratified.'°4 Article VI of the Constitution provides that "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 0 5 Second, cus-
tomary international law binds the United States. For example, in The
Paquette Habana,10 6 the Supreme Court held that the capture of two
98. Universal Declaration, supra note 67, art. 14.
99. Id. art. 15. For a discussion on the binding nature of the Universal Declaration, see
Young-Anawaty, supra note 94, at 459.
100. See Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 67; Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 67. Refugees suffer serious deprivations of most of
these rights. They are frequently in high risk of danger, subjected to inhuman living condi-
tions, and without home or nationality. Cambodian refugees serve as a good example of
these problems. For a description of the tragic living conditions in the Cambodian refugee
camp of Khao-I-Dang, see infra note 234.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
102. Id. art. 55.
103. Id. art. 56.
104. A nation is bound to act in conformity with the provisions of any legally binding
international document it signs. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A.Conf./39/27, at 289, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 579 (1969).
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
106. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Justice Grey declared that "International Law is part of our
law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their deter-
mination." Id. at 700.
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Spanish fishing boats by the United States during the war with Spain
violated customary international law.107
Moreover, U.S.courts increasingly acknowledge the obligations of
the United States under its treaties and customary international law.
In a series of cases involving Haitian refugees illegally in the United
States, a district court found that the activities of the INS violated
petitioners' rights under the Protocol and the Convention.108 In Fer-
nandez v. Wilkinson,'0 9 the court found the INS bound by customary
international law. The court declared that "even though the indeter-inate detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the
United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially reme-
dial as a violation of international law." 110 In sum, both the positive
law of treaties as well as customary international law define recogniza-
ble legal rights.' 1
III. THE DILEMMA OF CAMBODIAN REFUGEES
The oppressive Khmer Rouge regime and Vietnam's subsequent
invasion of Cambodia forced hundreds of thousands of Cambodians to
seek refuge in Thailand.' 12 Keeping its promise to help Thailand
resettle the refugees, the United States established a screening process
to determine those persons eligible for resettlement in the United
States, and to reject those deemed "prior persecutors."' 1 3 A close look
at this screening process reveals many problems.' 14 Such findings
compel an analysis of the consistency of this screening process with
United States and international law.
A. BACKGROUND OF CAMBODIAN REFUGEE MOVEMENTS
Gross deprivations of civil, political, and economic rights fre-
107. Id.
108. See Bertrand v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Vigile v. Sava, 535 F.
Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York cited Article 31 (prevention of penalties due to illegal entry and prevention of unnec-
essary restrictions on movements) and Article 3 (forbidding discrimination in applying the
treaty) of the Convention and the Protocol. Anker, Haitians Win NY Custody Battle, 5
IMMIGR. J. 12 (Mar. 1982).
109. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D.Kan. 1980). The question under review was whether the INS
had acted arbitrarily in indeterminately detaining an excluded alien, who had neither been
convicted of a crime in the United States nor found to be a security risk.
110. Id. at 798. The court cited a number of international instruments that, together
with other sources, provided a consensus of international law on arbitrary detention. See
Note, Fernandez v. Wilkinson: Making the United States Accountable Under Customary
International Law, 10 J. INT'L L. & POL. 360 (1981).
I 11. Schneebaum, Legal Rights of Refugees: Two Case Studies and Some Proposals for a
Strategy, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 373, 379.
112. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 122-28, 130-36 and accompanying text.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 143-57.
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quently cause refugee movements.115 The story of Cambodian refu-
gees is no different. Since 1970, the Cambodian people have endured
foreign invasion, civil wars, massive aerial bombardment, widespread
famine, and foreign occupation. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge, Cambo-
dia's communist movement led by Pol Pot, won control of the nation.
The Khmer Rouge's ensuing mass murder of their fellow countrymen
during their three-year rule "remains one of the most profound trage-
dies of recent history." 116 Over a million of that nation's total popula-
tion of seven million died during this brief period.' 17 Subsequently, on
Christmas Day 1978, the Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia.
Within weeks, the Khmer Rouge regime disintegrated, and Vietnam
replaced it with a government friendly to Vietnam, the People's
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).118
Because of Vietnam's full-fledged invasion and continued efforts
to stamp out resistance, tens of thousands of Cambodians fled the
country. 119 The majority of these refugees crossed the border into
Thailand, 120 while many tragically died from Vietnamese military
attacks and land mines.1 21 The United States and other nations subse-
quently assured the Thais that they would find refugees permanent
homes outside of Thailand if Thailand would grant the refugees first
asylum. 122
B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Resettlement In the United States
The United States established a refugee program in Thailand,
which operated out of its embassy and attempted to identify refugees
eligible for entry into the United States.123 From 1975 to 1983, the
United States admitted 120,000 Cambodian refugees. 124 In mid-1983,
115. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, KAMPUCHEA: AFTER THE WORST
1 (1985).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id. at 17.
119. Only a very few refugees were able to escape Cambodia during Pol Pot's rule
because of well-sealed borders. Devecchi, Politics and Policies of "First Asylum" in Thai-
land, INT'L RESCUE COMMITrEE (date unknown).
120. These waves of refugees included Khmer Rouge political and military figures, flee-
ing the Vietnamese occupation forces, as well as starving peasants and urban, educated
people. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, CAMBODIAN REFUGEES IN THAILAND: THE
LIMITS OF ASYLUM 4 (1982) [hereinafter LIMITS OF ASYLUM].
121. In June 1979, 42,000 Khmer were forced to return to Cambodia at Preat Vihear.
See JOINT REPORT, supra note 59, at 15; see also STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at IX.
122. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.
123. This program was comprised of State Department officials, INS officials, and con-
tract employees of the Joint Voluntary Agency. In Washington, the Department of State's
Refugee Bureau is primarily responsible for developing U.S. refugee policy. Id.
124. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
1987]
180 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
however, the rejection rate of the 40,000 Khmer seeking resettlement
rose significantly.125 In the early months of 1985, State Department
officials declared that the United States would soon stop processing
Cambodian refugees in Thailand. 126 The officials stated that the
remaining Cambodians in Thailand were ineligible for admission.1 27
Out of the 25,000 refugees in the remaining Khmer camp of Khao-I-
Dang, the United States screening program disqualified 14,500 appli-
cants as either security risks or non-refugees (i.e., not satisfying the
definition of "refugee" in the Refugee Act of 1980). 128
2. The Need to Screen for "Prior Persecutors"
The Cambodian refugee flows into Thailand after the 1978 Viet-
nam invasion included both victims of the Khmer Rouge's persecu-
tions and the persecutors themselves. 129 Yet knowledgeable sources
maintain that "most of the Khmer Rouge soldiers and cadre and their
families returned either to Pric or Nong Pru on the Thai-Cambodian
border during the June 1980 'repatriation'. . . .-13 Because a small
number of Khmer Rouge stayed behind, the United States instituted a
program necessary to screen those Cambodian refugees seeking reset-
tlement in the United States. Since this screening program dramati-
cally influences the futures of thousands of people, it is imperative that
the program conform with domestic and international law.
C. UNITED STATES SCREENING PROCESS
1. Mechanics of the Screening Process
The screening process currently requires three steps, with each
step involving a separate agency.' 3 ' The Joint Voluntary Agency
125. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at IX.
126. See N.Y. Times, supra note 124, at 1, col. 4.
127. Id. Officials refer here to the approximately 25,000 refugees in the main camp at
Khao-I-Dang. In addition to these individuals, there are approximately 230,000 "dis-
placed" Cambodians living in camps, just inside the Thai border; who were driven there by
recent Vietnamese military activities. These persons have not been registered as refugees by
the United Nations, nor regarded as such by the Thais or principal resettlement countries
(United States, Canada and Australia). Thailand intends to induce them to return to Cam-
bodia when the situation permits. Although there is discussion of the United States screen-
ing these displaced persons, at this point they have been categorized as non-refugees and
ineligible for resettlement. The handling of these "displaced" persons is not at issue in this
Note. See Washington Post, Jun. 17, 1985, at 27 (weekly ed.); N.Y. Times, May 22, 1985,
at 4, col 3.
128. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1985, at 4, col. 3. As for the remaining 10,000 of the camp
population, 2,000 have yet to be interviewed, 4,300 have been allowed to xmain by the
Thai government even without official refugee status, and 4,000 are believed to have been
accepted by other countries. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1985, at 7, col. 1.
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(JVA), an arm of the International Rescue Committee, identifies, inter-
views and arranges sponsorship for refugees. 132 Personnel from the
JVA initially screen the applicants. 133 Those applicants it suspects of
having persecuted others under the Khmer Rouge are directed to Eth-
nic Affairs Officers (EAO) of the Department of State Refugee
Bureau.134 The EAO then subjects the applicant to a more in-depth
examination. 135 Lastly, an INS official interviews the applicant, along
with his or her family. Based on information and determinations sup-
plied by the EAO, the INS makes the final decision on the applicant's
eligibility for resettlement in the United States. 136
Sensitive to the humanitarian concerns of Cambodian resettle-
ment, Congress and the Reagan administration issued a series of meas-
ures intended to ease the burden of proof for Cambodian refugee
applicants. 137 These measures included a series of directives to the
INS known as the Kamput Cables, 138 National Security Decision
Directive Number 93,139 and the INS Worldwide Guidelines on Over-
seas Refugee Processing of August 1983.140
President Reagan's directive instructed the Attorney General to
"determine whether there are categories of persons who ...share
common characteristics that identify them as targets of persecution in
a particular country .... Applicants for refugee status who fall into
any such categories of fact ... and who allege persecution will not
132. Id. at 16.
133. Id. at 36.
134. Id.
135. The Ethnic Affairs Offices are privately contracted and review cases for civil or
military service verification and communist affiliation. Unidentified Report from the Joint
Volunteer Agency in Thailand, U.S. Refugee Program in Thailand, at 22 [on file at Cornell
International Law Journal].
136. Specifically, the INS determines whether the applicant qualifies as a refugee as
defined by the Refugee Act of 1980, and as incorporated by the Immigration and National-
ity Act. The service additionally ensures that the refugee is not otherwise excludable from
U.S. admission. The INS interviews for the Khao-I-Dang applicants are conducted in a
processing center at Ban Thai Smart near Aranyaprathet. The INS in Thailand is headed
by an Officer-in-Charge and three permanent immigration officers. The individuals, plus an
additional six to eight officers on temporary assignment, report to the Ambassador in Thai-
land and to the INS District Director in Hong Kong. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 21-
22.
137. American Council for Nationalities Service, Computer Survey of Denied
Cambodian Cases Raises Questions About Review Process, 6 REFUGEE REP. No. 11 (Nov. 8,
1985) [hereinafter Cambodian Cases].
138. Kamput Cables, regarding Reference Processing of Cambodian Refugee Applicants
at Camp Kamput (10/29/82 to 7/14/83) [hereinafter Kamput Cables. On file at Cornell
International Law Journal].
139. Presidential National Security Decision Directive No. 93, May 13, 1983, discussed
in WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 24-25 [hereinafter Presidential Directive].
The Presidential Directive "was intended to ensure proper and effective processing consis-
tent with United States law and policy objectives, including steps to improve control gui-
dance." WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 24.
140. WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, supra note 57.
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have to present independent evidence regarding persecution." 141 The
Attorney General subsequently assigned the development of these cat-
egories to the INS. The INS responded by releasing guidelines that
delineated eight categories of persons.142
2. Results of the Screening Process
Since the release of the guidelines, the "INS has performed admi-
rably in Thailand, approving about 35,000 of the approximately
53,000 Cambodian applicants at [Khao-I-Dang]." 143 Nevertheless,
"many people closely connected with the Khmer review process feel
the spirit of these measures [-even the letter of the Worldwide Guide-
lines-] is not being followed." 144 There is concern that "too rigorous
a standard is being applied to the Khmer and that many of the 14,500
rejectees remaining at [Khao-I-Dang] were denied for reasons which
should not be considered damning in view of the guidelines." 145
The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand ordered a computer survey of
1,898 denied cases; the results of the survey indicate an extremely seri-
ous problem in the screening process.1 46 The following is a representa-
tive sampling, not a complete presentation, of the survey's results.
Approximately forty cases (180 people) "appear to have been denied
solely on the basis of being 'old people' or 'base people'." 147 These
141. J. Mitchell, Report on Impressions Following a Week in Bangkok, Thailand, April
13-21, Reviewing Khmer Refugee Policy and Practice 7 (1985) (unpublished manuscript).
142. Presently the categories in WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES apply only to applicants
from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. The categories for Kampuchea are as follows:
A) Former officials of the government prior to 1975 takeover.
B) Former members of the military prior to 1975 takeover.
C) Persons formerly or presently employed by U.S. or Western institutions; per-
sons educated in the West and persons who have worked in refugee programs.
D) Ethnic Chinese.
E) Buddhist monks.
F) Persons who left Kampuchea between 1975 and 1980 and who experienced
imprisonment, forced relocation, forced labor and forced family separation; or
persons with family members who had experienced such treatment or who
had been killed or had disappeared.
G) Persons with close relatives in the United States.
H) Members of households of persons falling into any of the preceding
categories.
WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 32-35.
143. Bangkok Joint Voluntary Agency, Observations on the Khmer Review Process 2
(Sept. 23, 1985) (unpublished report detailing a computer survey conducted by the Ameri-
can Embassy in Bangkok) [hereinafter Observations]. The computer survey is reprinted in
6 REFUGEE REPORTS, supra note 137.
144. Observations, supra note 143, at 2.
145. Id.
146. Based on a recommendation by the Joint Voluntary Agency, Ambassador Brown
in the Bangkok embassy ordered a computer survey of the denied cases. See Cambodian
Cases supra note 137, at 3. A "case" may involve more than one person. For example, a
family applying together would be processed as one case.
147. Id. at 4.
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terms refer to people who resided in areas that the Khmer Rouge took
over before April 1975, and who remained there despite the inva-
sion.'48 It does not follow, however, that these individuals were
Khmer Rouge sympathizers or supporters simply because they did not
flee from their homes. It is even more unlikely that these individuals
committed acts of persecution.149
The screening committee denied admission to other applicants
because they had engaged in one or more "normal" activities-i.e.,
they were favored by the Khmer Rouge, and consequently escaped
persecution. 150 Examples of such normal activities include growing
vegetables; tending livestock; traveling by ox cart, bus or train; and
being treated by a doctor.151 In addition, if an applicant had even a
distant familial relationship with a person alleged to have had a
Khmer Rouge connection, the screening committee often presumed
guilt by association.' 52 The committee denied asylum to 258 people,
for one of these two reasons.' 53
Finally, a number of cases were denied because of "lack of credi-
bility."' 54 For example, inconsistent stories given during the various
interviews with JVA, EAO and INS officials led to the denial of sev-
enty cases or 270 persons. 155 For those applicants with no indication
of Khmer Rouge involvement, denial of refugee status for this reason
is troubling.' 56 Although it undertook review processes in February
1985 and November 1985, the INS reexamined less than twenty-five
percent of the rejected cases and overturned only three percent of the
prior denials.15 7
IV. ANALYSIS
The INS screening process may not violate U.S. domestic law
(i.e., the Constitution, statutes, and case law), but it does violate the
legal obligation of the United States under international law.
Although compelling arguments exist for vesting the Cambodian refu-
148. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 39.
149. Id.
150. Observations, supra note 143, at 4; see also Cambodian Cases supra note 137, at 4.
151. Observations, supra note 143, at 4.




156. According to the STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 30, virtually all Cambodian
refugees lie at some point during their interviews. Many refugees believe rumors about
what answers the Americans want to hear, and accordingly they fabricate stories. Unfortu-
nately, since members of the Khmer Rouge must lie about their past, any unexplained
deceit is looked upon by an interviewer as highly suspicious.
157. S. GOLUB, LOOKING FOR PHANTOMS: FLAWS IN THE KHMER ROUGE SCREENING
PROCESS (United States Committee for Refugees Issue Brief 28 (1986)).
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gees with constitutional due process rights, 158 most authority suggests
that overseas aliens do not possess such rights.159 Consequently, the
INS screening process, which failed to incorporate standards or crite-
ria for evaluating Khmer Rouge affiliation, may not violate due pro-
cess. However, the lack of an automatic system of review for denied
refugee status eliminates the possibility of reversing arbitrary and
capricious decisions. 160 Finally, the screening committee has ignored
the few guidelines and directives that the government has provided for
Khmer refugee processing.1 61
Yet, by overlooking a number of international procedural protec-
tions for potentially excludable "refugees," the screening process vio-
lates several principles of international law. 162 In addition, the United
States, by rejecting qualified applicants, permits continued deprivation
of these refugees' basic human rights. Such conduct is clearly con-
trary to a number of international instruments 1 63
A. KHMER REFUGEE SCREENING: TECHNICALLY NOT A
VIOLATION OF U.S. LAW
1. The Rights of Overseas Refugees
Congress possesses the unquestionable power to refuse "prior per-
secutors" admission into the United States. 164 Furthermore, the fact
that Congress has statutorily excluded such persons in the Refugee
Act of 1980 is consistent with U.S. statutes and a series of interna-
tional agreements emerging after World War 11.165 Excluding "prior
persecutors" from benefits such as the right to non-refoulement and
the opportunity to seek haven in the United States is a commendable
policy. 166
Uncertainty arises, not in the notion of screening refugees to
exclude "prior persecutors," but in the screening process itself. To
what extent do overseas refugees possess the right to procedural due
process? United States courts have uniformly refused to find any con-
stitutional rights vested in overseas aliens seeking admission.1 67 How-
158. See supra notes 53-54, and infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 40-44, and infra note 167 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 35-37, and infra note 186 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 208-26 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
165. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
166. The concept of the United States containing sovereign power to exclude from its
borders whomsoever it chooses has been legally upheld by the Supreme Court on numerous
occasions. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
792 (1977); Mathew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
167. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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ever, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 with the following
objective: "To provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the
admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern
to the United States" (emphasis added). 168 The legislative history dis-
cussing the emergency admission provisions of the Act shows Con-
gress' intent to handle the screening of refugees in a manner consistent
with the Attorney General's prescribed regulations and procedures:
169
The Attorney General may admit [emergency situation refugees] as conditional
entrants or as permanent resident aliens, according to regulations and proce-
dures he may prescribe for dealing with emergency refugee situations. If ade-
quate screening is impossible under the circumstances, he may admit refugees
conditionally; if he is satisfied that time and circumstances permit adequate
screening, he should admit refugees as permanent resident aliens.
170
These passages indicate a desire for systematic admission of refugees
through adequate screening. The screening program used for
Cambodian refugees fails to satisfy this desire. 1
71
Recent Supreme Court holdings 172 tentatively support the argu-
ment that when the United States government confers important bene-
fits, it cannot constitutionally deprive an individual of such benefits
without due process of law. The establishment of an official screening
process in Thailand, and the lessening of the burden of proof under the
presidential directive, would most likely qualify as important
benefits.' 73
Moreover, in Landon v. Plasencia 174 the Court provided a "cost
benefit" analysis of procedural safeguards that supports this
argument:
In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider the interest
at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
through the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or
different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the
current procedures rather than additional or different procedures.
175
Admittedly, establishing procedural safeguards would substantially
increase administrative processing costs. Time consuming appeals by
rejected refugees, increased training of field officers, improved
resources (e.g., maps, history books), and increased manpower would
168. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1, § 101(b).
169. See S. REP. No. 256, supra note 22, at 10.
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 143-57 and accompanying text for results of computer survey of
rejected Cambodian refugees.
172. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1978); see also supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of alien
entitlements.
173. For discussion of the United States undertaking screening program, see supra notes
129-36 and accompanying text. For discussion of the Presidential Directive, see supra
notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
174. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
175. Id. at 34.
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add substantial expense and delay to the screening process. Yet the
humanitarian principles that are inherent in President Reagan's
National Security Decision Directive Number 93,176 the INS World-
wide Guidelines,177 and the Refugee Act of 1980178 do not admit to a
monetary value.
The INS screening process should incorporate additional safe-
guards for two reasons: (1) the interests at stake for Cambodian appli-
cants are enormously high, and (2) the procedures used in the
screening process produce erroneous results. Although an overseas
alien may arguably have no constitutional due process rights, the
United Nations Protocol, 179 which binds the United States, 180 guaran-
tees such rights.
2. A Screening Process Without Standards
United States refugee law does not explicitly mention the Khmer
Rouge, or delineate any criteria for the determination of Khmer
Rouge affiliation.'18 The INS and the State Department have failed to
provide meaningful criteria for (1) classifying people as Khmer Rouge;
(2) defining "culpability" as a persecutor; or (3) what constitutes
"meaningful participation" or "otherwise participated" in the persecu-
tion of others.182 Consequently, immigration officials in Thailand
have made subjective and arbitrary recommendations that have varied
significantly based on the individual officer's personal standards. ' 3
As mentioned above, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 to
provide a systematic procedure for admitting refugees of special
humanitarian concern.184 It can hardly be supposed that Congress
intended a standardless screening process whereby overworked and
underguided field agents make critical humanitarian deter-
minations. 18 5
176. Presidential Directive, supra note 139.
177. WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, supra note 57.
178. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1, § 101(a).
179. 1967 Protocol, supra note 6.
180. See 2 P. MUTHARIKA, supra note 3, at 272.
181. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 29.
182. Id.
183. Id. The author, Carl Ford, states:
Some [officers] consistently apply stringent criteria, while others consistently err on
the side of leniency.... All deplore the situation they find themselves in-having
to interpret the law the best they can-and are upset that the lawmakers and those
who set policy within the Executive Branch have not given them sufficient support
and guidance.
Id.
184. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 1, § 101(b).
185. See S. REP. No. 256, supra note 22, at 10.
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3. Limits to Agency Discretion Surpassed
A reviewing court may overturn an agency decision made in an
arbitrary, capricious or otherwise illegal manner.1 86 There is no
appeal, however, for a denial of refugee status. 187 Consequently, no
reviewing body exists to check for abuse of discretion and sufficiency
of evidence. If a review process were available to rejected Cambodian
refugees, it would arguably reveal an abuse of discretionary power.
An administrative officer abuses his discretion only when there is
no sufficient or rational basis for his decision.188 Many of the reasons
for which the INS denied an applicant's admission would undoubtedly
qualify as insufficient or irrational. Many of the reasons for rejecting
an applicant (e.g., engaging in "normal" activities, "nervousness dur-
ing the interview," and darker skin indicating peasant status and pos-
sible Pol Pot sympathy)18 9 illustrate far-reaching administrative
discretion. Middle-level officials involved in the processing of Khmer
refugees have privately expressed serious doubts about the screening
process, and have indicated their fears that many of the rejected cases
are "based on the flimsiest of evidence."' 190
In Laipenieks v. INS,'91 the court called for "clear, convincing
and unequivocal evidence" that an alien persecuted others in order to
deport him. 192 Optimally, government officials should apply this same
standard to overseas applicants. A number of human rights concerns
as well as foreign policy arguments militate against haphazardly label-
ling individuals "prior persecutors." Rejection for resettlement pro-
186. See IMMIGRATION DEFENSE, supra note 29; see also Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 550 F.
Supp. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 208 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983).
187. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
188. See Ludd, supra note 27.
189. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 37; see also Observations, supra note 143, at 4.
The fact that many refugees rejected by the United States as Khmer Rouge are accepted by
Canada or Australia, two countries that also exclude "prior persecutors," is evidence of the
irrationality of the indices used by United States officials to determine refugee status. J.
Mitchell, supra note 141, at 8.
190. STAFF RPORT, supra note 11, at 27. The EAOs and INS officers interviewing the
refugees recognize the imprecise nature of the system and are critical of having to imple-
ment the screening process with such poor guidelines. Id. These same officials "also
express doubts that the system poses an effective barrier to any real KR [Khmer Rouge]
bent on entering the United States." Id. Examples exist of culpable KR members who
would have slipped through the system had it not been for additional information from
eyewitnesses. Id. at 31.
191. 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
192. Laipenieks involved the issue of deporting an alien already in the U.S. based on the
persecutor exclusion clause of the Refugee Act of 1980. However, deporting an individual
already in the United States is not a more serious matter than preventing an overseas refu-
gee, in a high risk of being returned to the place of persecution, from entering the United
States. Consequently, the evidentiary standard for excluding such individuals should be
comparable, if not identical. See id.
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foundly affects an alien's future. 193 If the courts applied the
Laipenieks standard to overseas applicants, the current indices for
evaluating "prior persecutors" would undoubtedly violate the
standard. 194
Another arguably arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion
in this screening process occurs when a refugee requests a review of his
rejected application. Although there is no appeal for a denial of refu-
gee status, 195 rejection letters received by applicants state that deci-
sions will be reconsidered upon the presentation of "new evidence."' 196
Local INS officers, however, have made a sweeping decision that affi-
davits from friends, neighbors, or relatives submitted after a rejection
are "self-serving" and do not constitute new evidence. 197 Given the
finality and seriousness of these refugee determinations, such arbitrary
conclusions seem intolerable.
4. Violations of Kamput Cables, NSDD, and Worldwide Guidelines
The authors of the Kamput Cables, 198 President Reagan's
National Security Decision Directive 93,199 and the resulting INS
Worldwide Guidelines designed these documents to ease the burden of
proof on Indochinese refugees by granting a greater benefit of the
doubt.200 If an applicant proved that he fit into one of the INS's "per-
secuted person" categories, 20' then he established that he was a likely
target of persecution.20 2
In spite of these directives, the INS has denied refugee status to
thousands of refugees who fit into the established categories. The INS
based many of its denials on reasons other than security (i.e., lack of
credibility or inconsistent stories) even when the INS could have easily
verified the refugee's category status.20 3 According to the embassy
report, "[i]t seems totally consistent with the Worldwide Guidelines to
assume that, in the absence of some compelling reason to the contrary,
193. For a discussion of the probable significance of denied resettlement to Cambodian
refugees, see infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
194. Sample indices used in the screening process included a person's residence in Cam-
bodia before 1975, inconsistencies in the person's story, and whether or not the individual
fought or helped to fight against the Vietnamese invasion. See STAFF REPORT, supra note
11, at 37.
195. 8 C.F.R. § 207.4 (1986).
196. J. Mitchell, supra note 141, at 9.
197. Id.
198. Kamput Cables, supra note 138.
199. Presidential Directive, supra note 139.
200. It was the aim of Congress and the administration to reduce the impact of the
overwhelming hardships that befell Cambodians after 1975. See Observations, supra note
143, at 2.
201. See supra note 142.
202. WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 26.
203. J. Mitchell, supra note 141, at 2.
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such as some strong indication of Khmer Rouge involvement, all of
the above-mentioned cases are refugees". 2°4 Simply stated, the agency
violated the Worldwide Guidelines by denying status to those refugees
who otherwise satisfied the statutory definition.
The INS has ignored these directives and violated its own guide-
lines. A number of U.S. courts have held that guidelines are not regu-
lations and, therefore, not vested with the force of law.20 5 However,
one scholar writes: "Yet it may be more accurate to say that for those
courts which have not totally refused to consider review of the INS,
the operation instructions are viewed as quasi-standards of expected
agency behavior. '20 6 One court recently held that "while the [Opera-
tions Instructions do] not have the force of law, [they do] provide a
yardstick for judging the reasonableness of [agency decision
making]." 207
B. KHMER REFUGEE SCREENING: INCONSISTENT WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The U.S. screening process in Thailand violates international law
in three ways. First, the screening process denies rejected applicants
the procedural due process provided by the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol, which the UNHCR Handbook enumerates. 20 Second, the
process creates a population of unfairly rejected refugees who are not
prior persecutors, and who risk forcible return to Cambodia in viola-
tion of their right to non-refoulement.20 9 Third, the process deprives
of many basic human rights those refugees indiscriminately rejected as
"prior persecutors". 210
1. Violation of International Procedural Protections
INS officials have rejected a large number of Cambodian refugees.
In doing so, INS officials have applied an exclusion standard that vio-
lates the standard mandated by the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol. The UNHCR Handbook, recognized as an authoritative
interpretation of these instruments and cited in several U.S. cases, 211
204. Observations, supra note 143, at 4 (emphasis added).
205. Dong Sik Kwon v. INS, 646 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1981); Zacharakis v. Howerton, 517
F. Supp. 1026 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
206. Ludd, supra note 27, at 77.
207. Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35, 39 (C.D. Calif. 1980) (INS delay in process-
ing visa applications deemed "unreasonable" based on time frame provided by agency's
own Operations Instructions).
208. See infra text accompanying notes 211-12.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 223-26.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 227-38.
211. See A. HELTON, supra note 21, at 2-3; see also Zavala-Bonella v. INS, 730 F.2d
562, 569 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 465, 468 (1980).
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calls for a restrictive interpretation of the exclusion clauses because of
the serious consequences of exclusion.212 The 1951 Convention states
that the provisions of the Convention do not apply to an individual if
there are "serious reasons" for believing that, among other things, he
or she has committed a crime against humanity.213 Many of the rea-
sons for which INS officials labeled Cambodians as persecutors, such
as growing vegetables or being a "base" person, hardly qualify as seri-
ous reasons.
214
The Handbook also discusses the burdens of proof involved in the
screening process. It declares that the examiner must assess the valid-
ity and credibility of the applicant. 215 While the Handbook maintains
that the burden of proof rests with the applicant, documents are often
missing, and statements are not susceptible to proof. The Handbook
states: "In such cases, if the applicant's account appears credible, he
should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the
benefit of the doubt. ' 216 The computer survey of rejected applicants at
Khao-I-Dang and a Congressional Staff Report indicate, however,
that INS officials did not accord such a "benefit of the doubt. '217
The Handbook also recognizes that "an applicant for refugee sta-
tus is normally in a particularly vulnerable situation. ' 218 Subse-
quently, the Handbook requires qualified personnel, specially
established procedures, and competent interpreters. 219 At one point or
another during the processing of Khmer refugees, INS officials vio-
lated all three of these requirements. For example, inadequately
trained INS officials performed the difficult task of screening appli-
cants. 220 In some cases, it was discovered that incompetent interpret-
ers caused the refugee to give inconsistent answers during the
interviews. 22' But the most fundamental failing of the screening pro-
cess is its lack of clear guidelines or procedures to accurately deter-
mine prior persecutors. 222
212. HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 35.
213. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. l(f)(a).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 146-51. The computer survey, Observations,
supra note 143, examined many of these reasons.
215. HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 47.
216. Id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 144-57, 189-90.
218. HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 45.
219. Id. at 46.
220. None of the interviewers received special training, and virtually none had any
direct experience with Cambodia, or any Khmer language skills. The interviewers lacked
the depth of knowledge about Cambodia necessary for the screening process. STAFF
REPORT, supra note 11, at 30.
221. For an example of such an occurrence, see id. at 30 n.1.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85.
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2 Violation of the Principle of Non-refoulement
Numerous international instruments guarantee a refugee the right
of non-refoulement, a fundamental principle of refugee law.22 3 Evi-
dence supports the argument that non-refoulement is a principle of
customary law, binding on all states, independent of specific assent.224
The ramifications of denying refugee status to ,the Cambodians
remaining in Khao-I-Dang are extremely serious. Thailand originally
intended to send the remaining refugees back to Cambodia upon the
completion of the screening process. 225 While the Thais have said that
they will not forcibly return refugees, it is "likely that they will with-
draw non-essential services from Khao-I-Dang in order to encourage
voluntary relocation or close Khao-I-Dang as a refugee facility
altogether."22 6
The consequences are alarming for those refugees the INS has
incorrectly labeled "prior persecutors." These individuals likely will
face possible forced labor, imprisonment, or even death upon their
return to Cambodia. The United States will thus have been at least
partially responsible for their threatened safety.
3. Violation of Rejected Refugees' Human Rights
International human rights instruments accord refugees certain
rights, yet refugees unfairly rejected as "prior persecutors" will never
realize these rights. These instruments are necessary because the legal
mechanisms that provide for stateless persons and refugees are inade-
quate. Refugees are cut off from the tie of nationality, which normally
protects them under international law. Neither the 1951 Convention
nor the 1967 Protocol provide for automatic refuge or permanent
resettlement. Human rights instruments merely oblige governments to
treat individuals a particular way, regardless of race, creed, sex,
national origin, social class or political persuasion.22 7 The American
Convention on Human Rights,228 which legally binds the United
States, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man,2 29 grant, however, the right of asylum in accordance with the
legislation of the state.230
223. See supra notes 6, 25, 70 and accompanying text.
224. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 80, at 304.
225. STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 4.
226. D. GALLAGHER & S. FORBES, REFUGEES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: TOWARD A MORE
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY 10 (1985).
227. Young, Between Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee's Status, 1982 MICH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 339, 351.
228. American Convention, supra note 67, art. 22.
229. American Declaration, supra note 67, art. 27.
230. See Young-Anawaty, supra note 94, at 459.
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The screening process violates a number of the international legal
obligations of the United States. The INS, as discussed above, violated
its obligations under the UN Protocol to provide due process.231 In
addition, the INS violated the spirit of the Refugee Act of 1980, the
presidential directive, and the letter of the Worldwide Guidelines by
using a standardless screening process that erroneously rejected
deserving applicants.232 The United States has, therefore, violated its
obligations under Article 22 of the above-mentioned American Con-
vention and Article 27 of the American Declaration. The American
Declaration and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are
arguably evidence of customary international law, and consequently
bind the United States.233
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects basic
human rights unobtainable for Cambodians struggling in Khao-I-
Dang. The conditions of life in refugee camps are deplorable. 234 Refu-
gees, for their own security, must remain in the camps until they can
find a safe home elsewhere. They face degrading living conditions,
and have no nationality. Moreover, a strong possibility exists that
Thailand will return these rejected applicants to Cambodia, where
they would face likely extermination because of their opposition to the
current regime.235 Fundamental rights such as the "right to life, lib-
erty and security of person" 236 are in unquestionable danger. The
"luxuries" of civil, political and economic rights described in the
International Covenants on Human Rights will never be a reality for
these rejected Cambodians.
Although the United States is not deliberately violating any of
these refugees' rights, the arbitrary determinations of who is a "prior
persecutor" and therefore disqualified as a "refugee" effectively
deprive innocent people of the chance to enjoy certain human rights.
This action contravenes the principles of the United Nations Charter
to provide and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all.237 It also contravenes the Refugee Act of 1980 to
give "statutory meaning to [the United States'] national commitment
231. See supra text accompanying notes 84-91, 208-11.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 144-51, 181-85.
233. Young-Anawaty, supra note 94, at 459.
234. Khao-I-Dang is filled with either illegal inhabitants (those who arrived after Thai-
land closed its doors to new refugees), or desperate residents that have either never been
processed, or rejected for resettlement. The facts that illegal entrants are not entitled to
food and longer term residents receive money from relatives in the West, combined with
poor security, resulted in almost nightly robberies, beatings and killings. J. Mitchell, supra
note 141, at 5-6.
235. Id. at 7.
236. Universal Declaration, supra note 67, art. 3.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96, 101-03.
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to human rights and humanitarian concerns. ... ,,238
V. POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FAIR
SCREENING PROCESS
The INS has failed to recognize the political advantages of main-
taining a fair and legal screening process. Moreover, an unfair and
illegal screening process may ultimately lead to political harm. The
greatest harm lies in the rejection of thousands of innocent refugees for
resettlement. The United States prides itself on its humanitarian repu-
tation, but this reputation could suffer as a result of the abnormally
high rejection numbers. Furthermore, the remaining refugees gener-
ate tension between the United States and Thailand. The United
States must maintain good relations with Thailand, and instill confi-
dence in the Thai government about the U.S. commitment to the reset-
tlement of refugees. The United States assured Thailand in 1979 that
it would uphold its obligation to resettle refugees if Thailand contin-
ued to act as a country of first asylum. United States actions now may
dramatically influence future refugee crises. The Thai government
may refuse to admit refugees if it fears that they will permanently set-
tle in Thailand.239
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Officials responsible for developing U.S. refugee policy need to
provide detailed guidance to field officers in Thailand on how to inter-
pret Section 100(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.24 °
These officials should construct guidelines similar to the 1983 World-
wide Guidelines for Overseas Refugee Processing to delineate what
types of activities and affiliations constituted Khmer Rouge persecu-
tion. The officials must also indicate which activities demonstrate
meaningful and voluntary participation in Khmer Rouge acts of
persecution. 241
Before an officer labels an individual a "prior persecutor," there
should be specific and reliable allegations made either by intelligence
sources or other Cambodians to substantiate the decision. Unfortu-
nately, field officers are currently operating without a clear definition
of prohibited conduct. Consequently, officers use personal guidelines
238. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., REVIEW OF
UNITED STATES REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 80 (Comm. Print
1980) (comment by Sen. Kennedy, the original sponsor of the Refugee Act of 1980, noted
in the "Conference Report and Analysis of the Refugee Act of 1980" transmitted to the
President).
239. LIMITS OF ASYLUM, supra note 120, at 13-14.
240. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
241. See S. GOLUB, supra note 157, at 32.
1987]
194 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
resulting in inconsistent and erroneous determinations. Congress
should adopt legislative guidelines considered by some of its members
for defining Khmer Rouge affiliation. Such recommendations would
state:
With regard to Cambodian refugees who were not members of the Khmer
Rouge leadership or political, administrative, and military cadre, specific acts
of inhumanity or persecution of others would have to be alleged in order to
satisfy the purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It is the intent of
Congress that criteria of a general nature, such as residence in Pol Pot con-
trolled areas before 1957 would not be considered in themselves as grounds for
exclusion.2 4
2
One report recommends that several of the following categories could
provide more objective criteria for the identification of previous
Khmer Rouge members: members of the Communist Party of
Kampuchea, security system personnel at all levels, members of village
militia, and governing or administrative committee members at all
levels.2 43
In order to determine which individuals belonged to the Khmer
Rouge, field officers need access to more information. Experts in
Cambodian history, personnel from INS and the State Department,
and intelligence analysts have the expertise to compile an historical
data base. Access to such a data base would result in more informed
decision making. Officials should also consult scholars, relief workers,
UNHCR officials and others to obtain their rough estimates of how
many Khmer Rouge are in Khao-I-Dang. 244 Most experts conclude
that many of the Khmer Rouge left Khao-I-Dang and returned to the
border;245 consequently, the INS screening process should reflect this
fact. In addition, better supplies (e.g., maps), better working and living
conditions for personnel at the processing center, and improved train-
mng programs for newly assigned officers would improve the accuracy
of the process.246
Finally, the United States should cease all processing of Khmer
refugees until proper guidance and procedural improvements are
forthcoming. The United States must make a "good faith effort to keep
the residual of KID [Khao-I-Dang] as small as humanly possible"2 47
to avoid a confrontation with Thailand.
242. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
243. Id. at 40.
244. S. GOLUB, supra note 157, at 32.
245. Id. at 6.
246. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.




The United States' desire to shut its doors to "prior persecutors"
is consistent with commonly held notions of fairness and justice. No
justification exists for the true "prior persecutor's" conduct. There-
fore, the goal to screen out persons responsible for human rights
abuses is admirable; the process, however, is flawed and most likely
illegal. The screening violates the due process safeguards of the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and possibly continues to
deprive refugees of basic human rights. The current screening process
additionally ignores a presidential directive, INS guidelines, and Con-
gress' intent that the Refugee Act of 1980 provide systematic proce-
dures for refugee admission. The application of well-defined
guidelines and standards should set a precedent for future refugee
resettlement. This is particularly important given the increased
number of refugees world-wide and the bleak future erroneously
denied refugees can expect in their home territories. The INS must
accept the task of devising and implementing a well-conceived and fair
screening procedure that is based on full information.
Deborah G. Bowers
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